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Abstract
This paper analyses retirement expectations and outcomes using the two waves of the
UK Retirement Survey, undertaken in 1988-89 and 1994. We argue that responses to
questions on expectations are not straightforward to interpret where individuals are
asked to report point expectations. As in the studies for the US by Bernheim, the
evidence here suggests that individuals tend to report their most likely retirement date.
About half of the sample retired when they expected.  Men tend to retire earlier than
expected on average, but with only two waves of data we cannot reject that this is
caused by a common shock over the period. Changes in health and marital status are
linked to divergences between expectations and realisations. We extend the analysis to
consider ‘don’t know’ responses, which we argue may be a rational response when
individuals face greater uncertainty over their future retirement date. We provide
evidence to support this hypothesis. Finally, we show that information on expectations
can improve the accuracy of models of actual retirement behaviour, most likely because
they provide a suitable proxy for unobserved tastes for income and leisure.
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Executive summary
This paper uses data from the two waves of the Retirement Survey in 1988/89 and
1994 to analyse retirement expectations and outcomes.
We find that the distribution of reported expectations is very condensed: more than
half of the sample expects to retire at the state pension age. Having an occupational
pension, current health status and current and past employment have a significant
effect on whether someone expects to retire before or after the state pension age.
We argue that answers to questions about retirement expectations are not
straightforward to interpret when, as here, people are asked to give single point
expectations. If individuals face uncertainty about their future retirement they will
have to condense an underlying probability distribution into a single summary
statistic. This means that the distribution of reported expectations is likely to be more
condensed that the distribution of outcomes. We show that, as in the studies for the
US by Bernheim, the evidence suggests that individuals tend to report their most
likely retirement date.
About half of the sample retired when they said they expected to. Men were more
likely to retire earlier than expected than later. However, with only two waves of data
available we cannot reject that this is due to the presence of common macro shocks,
particularly since there was a recession between the two waves of the survey. We find
that changes in health and marital status between the two waves of the survey are
linked to divergences between expectations and realisations.
We extend the analysis to consider the group of people who say that they don’t know
when they expect to retire. This is a sizeable group – nearly 15% of men and 30% of
women. We argue that ‘don’t know’ may be a rational response when individuals face
greater uncertainty over their future retirement date. We provide evidence to support
this hypothesis.
Finally, we show that information on expectations can improve the accuracy of
models of actual retirement behaviour, most likely because they provide a suitable
proxy for unobserved tastes for income and leisure.3
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM RETIREMENT
EXPECTATIONS DATA?
1 Introduction
This paper examines retirement expectations and retirement behaviour in Britain. It
considers the role of previous expectations of retirement age in the retirement decision
- both as an indicator of forward-looking retirement planning and as a plausible proxy
for unobserved heterogeneity in retirement behaviour. To do so, it uses data from the
Retirement Survey, which sampled a group of households in the UK that contained at
least one individual aged between 55 and 69 in a period covering late 1988 and 1989.
1
Surviving individuals who could be followed-up were re-interviewed in 1994.
2
Retirement behaviour is an important but under-researched topic in Britain. This is in
spite of dramatic changes in the labour market behaviour of older workers.
Participation rates for men aged 55-64 have fallen by around 20 percentage points
over the last 25 years, and while there has been less of a fall in employment among
older women this contrasts with rising levels of employment among women aged 25-
54.
3 Yet the issue of retirement has been subjected to very little serious econometric
research in Britain.
4 Undoubtedly one reason for this has been a lack of suitable data
sets, in contrast to the United States.
5 The Retirement Survey, in part, redresses this.
The availability of two waves of data from the Retirement Survey allows us to match
individuals’ prior expectations of their retirement age, collected in the first wave, with
their subsequent behaviour, observed by the second wave. Similar studies have
                                                
1 For further details on sampling procedures and some cross-tabulations from the first wave of the
sample, see Bone et al (1992). On retirement behaviour, using the first wave of the Retirement Survey,
see Disney, Meghir and Whitehouse (1994).
2 See Disney, Grundy and Johnson (1997).
3 For further details, see Disney, Meghir and Whitehouse (1994), and Tanner (1998). For international
comparisons, see Disney (1996).
4 Notable exceptions are Zabalza, Pissarides and Barton (1980) and Meghir and Whitehouse (1997)
5 The economic theory of retirement behaviour is surveyed by Lazear (1986), who emphasises the
forward-looking aspects of the retirement decision. In contrast, many early studies in the United States
and, implicitly, Zabalza et al (1980) implicitly model retirement using a static labour supply model: for
a survey of the US literature with greater emphasis on ‘present value’ calculations, see Quinn,
Burkhauser and Myers (1990) and also the ‘option value’ approach of Stock and Wise (1990). Still
fewer papers model retirement structurally as a forward-looking problem to be solved recursively, as4
already been carried out in the US (see Bernheim (1989) and Hurd (1996)). While
some scepticism has been expressed about the validity of expectations data (see
Keane and Runkle (1990)), these studies have found that reported retirement
expectations are not random, to the extent that they are correlated with the observable
risk factors that are known to affect actual retirement behaviour (such as gender,
wealth and pension status).
Considerable attention in empirical studies using expectations data has focused on
whether individuals appear to form ‘rational’ expectations (see Wolpin and Gonul
(1985), Bernheim (1989) and Das and van Soest (1997)). By rational is meant that
individuals’ expectations equate to the best prediction of future outcomes taking
advantage of all currently available information. One implication of the rational
expectations hypothesis is that, in the absence of common macro-shocks, the
distribution of retirement expectations should correspond to the distribution of
observed retirement outcomes. With several waves of panel data it may be reasonable
to assume that macro-shocks average to zero over time. However this cannot be
assumed with only two waves of data and the fact that people do not retire when they
expected does not automatically lead us to reject the rational expectations hypothesis.
This is particularly the case since there was a recession between the two waves of the
Retirement Survey that may have been associated with a negative shock to
employment prospects.
6
More generally, however, we argue that the rational expectations hypothesis is not
straightforward to test, particularly where individuals are asked to report point
retirement expectations such as in the Retirement Survey. If individuals face
uncertainty about their date of retirement they will have to condense an underlying
probability distribution over a number of different expected retirement ages into a
single measure. As Bernheim (1989) and Das (1996) have argued, there is no reason
for assuming that individuals will make a prediction that corresponds to a
mathematical ‘expectation’. In fact, Bernheim (1989) suggests that respondents tend
to report their most likely, rather than their mean expected retirement age. We show
                                                                                                                                           
the data requirements in so doing are considerable. For examples of the structural approach, see
Berkovec and Stern (1991), Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) and Rust and Phelan (1997).5
that this is also the case in the UK. A related issue, not addressed in previous US
studies, is how to interpret the responses of those who say that they don’t know when
they expect to retire. It is easy to dismiss such responses as uninformed and drop them
from the analysis. Alternatively, a ‘don’t know’ response may reflect a genuine
degree of uncertainty about the timing of retirement, and we provide some support for
this hypothesis here.
A final issue, from a practical point of view, is whether knowledge of individuals’
retirement expectations can improve econometric models of individual retirement
behaviour. The most plausible reason for thinking that expectations might improve the
model is that the covariates of the retirement hazard comprise not just observables but
also unobservables, such as preferences over income and leisure, for which
expectations data might be a suitable proxy.
With these issues in mind, the outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The
next section describes the Retirement Survey data that we use. Section 3 considers in
more detail some of the methodological issues that arise in using expectations data.
Section 4 compares expectations and outcomes for individuals while section 5
explores whether knowledge of expectations can improve the econometrician’s model
of actual retirement behaviour. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The data that we use in this study are drawn from the Retirement Survey. This is the
first, large-scale panel data set in the UK to focus on individuals around the time of
retirement. In this respect it is similar to the Retirement History Survey (RHS) and the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) in the US. Like the two US surveys, the
Retirement Survey contains detailed information on individuals’ health, wealth,
income and retirement behaviour, and a retrospective event history covering family
composition and the main labour market events. It also contains information on
individuals’ expectations of retirement. Unlike the two US surveys, however, the
Retirement Survey has only two waves. Wave 1, carried out in 1988/89, collected
                                                                                                                                           
6 The rate of unemployment was 6.27% in 1989, 5.78% in 1990, 8.02% in 1991, 9.76% in 1992,
10.33% in 1993 and 9.37% in 1994.6
information on 3543 ‘key respondents’ who were then aged 55-69, together with 609
spouses outside this age range, a total of 4152 individuals. Wave 2 was collected in
1994. About two-thirds of the original sample of key respondents and spouses were
re-interviewed. 11% of respondents are known to have died in this interval, while the
residual attrition is a combination of non-response and (perhaps) unreported mortality.
In this paper we focus on a selected sample of individuals in the Retirement Survey.
First, we select only those who appear in both waves of the Survey. Since the rates of
(non-mortality) attrition between the two waves are not random, the sample of
survivors is re-weighted to correct for known differential attrition rates by age, socio-
economic status and gender.
7 A second selection we make is that, within the group of
survivors, we look only at those who have not yet retired by the first wave of the
sample, and who respond to the question on expected age of retirement (see Figure
A1 in the Appendix).
8
The definition of retirement that we use is a purely subjective one. Individuals are
defined as retired if they say that they consider themselves to be retired. Many
previous studies have adopted objective measures, such as the point of permanent
departure from employment, if this is known (see Blau (1994), Disney, Meghir and
Whitehouse (1994)), in order to avoid the problem of what subjectively-defined
retirement actually means. Since this paper will be concerned with comparing
individuals’ expectations and realisations of retirement, this issue matters less. The
main thing is that people refer to expectations and realisations of the same event in
their minds, however defined.
On average, the group of individuals that we focus on is likely to retire later in life
than the full sample. Table A1 in the Appendix gives the sample proportions for our
selected group relative to the sample of all wave 2 survivors. Not only does the
selected sample differ in observable characteristics (such as gender, age, health and
whether or not they have a private pension) but also presumably in unobservable
characteristics, such as preferences over work and leisure. Since, for the most part in
                                                
7 A detailed description of the grossing factors used to re-weight the sample is given in the Appendix to
Disney, Grundy and Johnson (1997)
8 We also exclude people who do not consider themselves to be retired, but are not currently employed
and do not intend returning to work.7
this paper, we compare expectations and outcomes for the same people, the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity is not a central issue. However, without controlling for
selectivity, our later reduced form regression results for retirement age are likely to be
biased. Since our aim is to examine the role of expectations, this is not a major
problem, but we would emphasis that the results presented in this paper are not meant
to be a reduced form model of retirement behaviour for the general population.
3 Methodological issues in the analysis of retirement expectations
Data concerning expectations are not straightforward to interpret. This section
considers subjective retirement expectations in more detail; in particular how might
respondents interpret a survey question concerning their retirement expectations?
How might people respond when they have more than one expected age of
retirement? And how do we handle people who give ‘don’t know’ as an answer?
The distribution of expected retirement ages
All people in the first wave of the Retirement Survey who have not retired are asked
‘at what age do you expect to retire?’ The distributions of expected retirement ages
for men and women are plotted in Figure 1 (including the proportions of men and
women who say that they do not know when they expect to retire). The distribution of
expected ages of retirement for men is dominated by a ‘spike’ at 65, the age at which
men first become eligible to receive the state pension, with more than 60% of men
saying that they expect to retire at this age. Around one-third of women say that they
expect to retire at 60 (the state pensionable age for women), although nearly the same
number say that they do not know when they expect to retire.
The dominance of the distribution by spikes at state pension age and ‘don’t knows’
might suggest that little interesting information is provided by these responses.
However, a plausible explanation for the concentration of responses may lie in the
way the expectations questions in the Retirement Survey are framed. Individuals may
expect to retire at a number of different ages, with differing probabilities but they are
asked to report a single summary statistic of their underlying distribution. Even if the
underlying probability distribution were the same as the distribution of outcomes, we
would anticipate that the distribution of reported expected retirement ages would be8
more heavily concentrated than the distribution of actual retirement ages.
9  Looking at
Dutch income expectations, Das (1996) also finds that the dispersion in expected
income changes is smaller than the dispersion in actual income changes. We will
return to the issue of the interpretation of point expectations in the next section.
Figure 1: Distribution of expected retirement ages
                                                
9 A simple illustration illuminates the point. Suppose I (and the rest of the population) think that the
probabilities of retiring at 62, 63, 65 and 66 are respectively 0.1, 0.2, 0.5 and 0.2. When asked to give a
single expected age of retirement a possible response is to say 65 since it is the mode and mean (to the
nearest whole age) of the underlying probability distribution. In the absence of any shocks, 10 per cent
of the population retires at 63, 20 per cent at 64, 50 per cent at 65 and 20 per cent at 66. In this case the
observed distribution of actual retirement ages is more dispersed than the distribution of reported
expected ages (which is a single spike at 65). Comparing outcomes to reported expectations we would
conclude that half the population did not retire when they expected, and that more people retired earlier
than expected than retired later than expected whereas in fact the subjective and the objective
probability distributions are identical. More recent surveys seek to avoid this problem by asking
questions about future events that more closely reflect the fact that individuals’ expectations may be a
distribution of probabilities over several possible outcomes. In the US Health and Retirement Survey,
for example, individuals are asked to indicate the chances of various future events, such as retiring at
62 or 65, on a scale of 1 to 10. For attempts to build up probability distributions for expectational
variables of this type, see inter alia Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Hurd and McGarry (1995), Juster and
Smith (1997) and Manski (1990)9
We can reject the hypothesis that reported retirement ages are purely random numbers
since people do vary their expected age of retirement according to their individual
circumstances in a plausible manner. The first (albeit obvious) difference is that, on
average, women expect to retire at earlier ages than men. In addition, other observable
characteristics which are known to be correlated with retirement age in practice co-
vary with retirement expectations in the same way. We show this by means of an
ordered probit regression. Given the importance of the state pension age in the
distribution of retirement ages we define a dependent variable that takes the value 1, 2
or 3 if the individual expects to retire before, at or after the state pension age
respectively. For the moment we exclude those who say they don’t know when they
expect to retire. On the right-hand-side we include a set of variables that reflect an
individual’s current characteristics and employment history (since age 25). Separate
regressions are run for men and for women. Estimates of the marginal effects are
reported in Table 1. A full set of results is given in the Appendix.10
Table  1
Marginal effects on expected age retirement age (relative to state pension age)
Men Women
Before At After Before At After
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 *  -0.080   0.074   0.007 * -0.894   0.772   0.122
Ln(individual income) in W1   0.044  -0.040  -0.004   -0.521   0.450   0.071
No educational qualification  0.001  -0.001   0.000   -0.017  -0.102   0.118
Married in W1  0.073  -0.051  -0.022    0.023   0.205  -0.228
Divorced/ widowed in W1  0.073  -0.062  -0.012    0.050   0.162  -0.212
W1 severity score 2-3  0.075  -0.063  -0.012    0.009   0.047  -0.057
W1 severity score > 3  0.180  -0.161  -0.019 *    0.149   0.189  -0.338
Occupational pension *  0.124  -0.089  -0.035    0.012   0.081  -0.093
Saved for retirement  0.061  -0.047  -0.014   -0.010  -0.061   0.071
Employment status and history
Unemployed in W1  0.108  -0.094  -0.015    0.009   0.046  -0.055
Part-time employed in W1* *  -0.178   0.074   0.105 *   -0.024  -0.219   0.243
Self-employed in W1  0.012  -0.009  -0.002 *   -0.032  -0.445   0.477
FT employed > 95% since  25 **  0.090  -0.071  -0.019    0.036   0.193  -0.229
% time not working since  25  0.123  -0.113  -0.010   -0.554   0.478   0.076
* Significant at 5%   **Significant at 10%
For both men and women age enters positively as might be expected – the older the
individual at the first wave the less likely they are to expect to retire before the state
pension age. Conditional on age, men with an occupational pension are significantly
more likely to expect to retire before the state pension age. This is consistent with
evidence showing that men with occupational pensions tend to retire earlier than those
without (see Disney, Meghir and Whitehouse (1995)). Also more likely to expect to
retire before the state pension age are men who have spent more than 95 per cent of
their working lives since age 25 in full-time employment. Men and women currently
in part-time employment are significantly more likely to expect to retire after the state
pension age. In the case of men this group is likely to comprise those who have left
their main lifetime employment and returned to work part-time. Poor health,
measured by the severity score at Wave 1, has a positive effect on the probability of11
expecting to retire before the state pension age, which is significant in the case of
women.
How should we treat ‘don’t knows’?
A further issue is the significant number of people in the sample who say that they do
not know when they expect to retire. In previous studies, such as Bernheim (1989),
those who give ‘don’t know’ responses are dropped from the sample. It is possible
that ‘don’t know’ responses simply reflect lazy or uninformed responses.
Alternatively, ‘don’t know’ responses may constitute rational responses by those who
face greater uncertainty over their future labour market behaviour, where they are
asked to give point retirement expectations. This idea was first put forward by Carlson
and Parkin (1975) in their seminal use of banded inflation expectations data, where
they suggest that individuals are using the following response strategy to a question
concerning expectations:
Respond with outcome j if pr outcome j () . ≥ 05
Respond with ‘don’t know’ if pr outcome j outcomes () . <∈ 05
To explore this further, we run a probit regression on a dummy variable that takes the
value one if someone says that they don’t know when they expect to retire. On the
right hand side we include, in addition to variables reflecting the individual’s current
characteristics and employment history, the number of years until the individual
actually retires.
The results, summarised in Table 2, provide some support for the view that a ‘don’t
know’ response reflects genuinely greater uncertainty over future retirement. The first
key finding is that the further away actual retirement is, and hence the less
compressed the individual’s underlying probability distribution is likely to be, the
more likely is a ‘don’t know’ response. Where the age of retirement, reported at Wave
2, fell within the same year or in the year after Wave 1 (‘one year or less’),
individuals were significantly more likely to have given an expected retirement date
in Wave 1.  On the other hand, individuals who had not retired by Wave 2, by which
time over 5 years had elapsed since Wave 1, were more likely to have given a ‘don’t
know’ response at Wave 1. A plausible interpretation of the positive significant effect12
of the individual liking their current job on the probability of giving a don’t know
response is that these people tend to retire later on average. Further evidence that
event distance is associated with greater uncertainty is given by the fact that when
asked the same expectations question in the second wave if they have still not retired,
the majority of don’t knows do give an expected age of retirement.
The results also suggest that individuals with a more variable employment history are
more likely to answer ‘don’t know’ to the retirement expectation question. In general,
the greater the individual’s involvement with the labour market in full-time
employment during their working lives, the less likely it is that they give a ‘don’t
know’ response. Men who have spent more than 95% of their time since age 25 in
full-time employment are less likely to give a don’t know response. Among women,
the greater the proportion of time spent not working, the more likely it is that they
give a don’t know response, although this is not significant. However, for women
being employed part-time at Wave 1 is associated positively and significantly with a
‘don’t know’ response. For men, having an occupational pension has a significant,
negative effect on the ‘don’t know’ response probability. Occupational pensions are
typically associated with career jobs and this result backs up the ‘95%+ full time’
result.  But it can also be argued that pension plans focus the mind on the retirement
decision and, like the variable ‘has saved for retirement’, which is also significant for
men, should reflect a greater individual propensity to think about retirement date.13
Table  2
Probit regression on expected age of retirement
Dependent variable











Age in Wave 1   .0148 .0054*   .0194  .0109**
Ln(individual income) in W1  -.0184 .0165 -.1582  .0531*
No educational qualification   .0088 .0296 -.0948  .0678
Married in W1   .0530 .0402 -.1641  .1965
Divorced/ widowed in W1   .2330 .1516*   .0077  .1765
W1 severity score 2-3 .1007 .0947 .3180 .1946**
W1 severity score > 3 .2025 .1590** -.0470 .1493
Occupational pension  -.1337 .0441* -.0097  .0697
Saved for retirement  -.0569 .0313**  -.0400  .0580
Likes current job   .0476 .0281**   .1233  .0586*
Employment status & history
Unemployed in W1  -.0358 .0647  -.0118 .1595
Part-time employed in W1  -.0053 .0674   .1940 .0762*
Self-employed in W1  -.0094 .0429   .1839 .2024
FT employed > 95% since age 25  -.0961 .0467*   .0772 .1919
% time not working since age 25 -.3030 .2966   .2175 .1549
Distance from actual retirement
One year or less -.0848 .0231*  -.1893 .0571*
Not retired Wave 2 (>5 years)  .1282 .0437*    .1064 .0724
Number of observations    426    270
Log likelihood  -132.85 -122.64
Pseudo R
2    0.2737     0.2520
LR χ
2(27)  100.15*     82.63*
Notes to Table:
* Significant at 5%   **Significant at 10%
Tests of significance of inclusion of regional dummies (accepted at 5%):
Men:      χ
2 = 19.35   Pr > χ
2  = 0.036
Women: χ
2 = 19.69   Pr > χ
2  = 0.032
Tests of significance of inclusion of lagged and current labour market states (accepted at 10%):
Men:      χ
2 =  9.50    Pr > χ
2  = 0.091
Women: χ
2 =  9.78    Pr > χ
2  = 0.08214
Some individual characteristics are also significant. Inability to provide a forecast is
not associated with lower educational attainment per se although, as Carlson and
Parkin (1975) point out, low educational attainment may be correlated with other
factors such as interrupted career history. However, women with higher levels of
income (which may also reflect higher educational attainment) are less likely to give a
‘don’t know’ response. Poor health (measured by severity scores) is also associated
with a higher probability of giving a ‘don’t know’ response. For men, being divorced
or widowed in Wave 1 also means a higher probability of a ‘don’t know’ response
although there is no clear interpretation of this result.
Given the small sample size and the proxy nature of many of these variables, these
results are not conclusive. But they do lend support to the argument that ‘don’t know’
responses to the retirement expectations questions may not simply be lazy or
uninformed, but may reflect genuinely greater uncertainty about retirement. At the
very least, these results show that the probability of giving ‘don’t know’ responses is
not random across the population and that, where the group of people who give ‘don’t
know’ responses is large, as here, excluding them altogether from the analysis may
lead to misleading results.
4  Do people retire when they expect to retire?
This section looks explicitly at whether people retire when they expect to. Our
analysis is based on the sub-sample of individuals who gave an expected retirement
age in Wave 1 and who had actually retired by the Wave 2 (see Figure A1 in the
Appendix). Table 3 gives the proportions of this group who retired at, before or after
their expected age of retirement (Panel A) and those who retired within one year of
their expected age of retirement, or before or after, respectively (Panel B). Nearly one
half of individuals retire when they expect to (and nearly two-thirds retire within a
year of when they expect). Clearly, given the dominance of the state pensionable ages
in the distribution of expected retirement ages, much of this may simply reflect people15
retiring at these ages. In fact, a fairly high proportion of those who report expected
retirement ages other than the state pensionable age also retire when they expect.
10
Table 3
Retirement Expectations and Outcomes








Whole sample 37.2% 46.8% 16.0% 421
Men 43.5% 44.2% 12.4% 265
Women 26.7% 51.2% 22.1% 156








Whole sample 25.8% 65.5% 8.7% 421
Men 31.4% 62.4% 6.2% 265
Women 16.3% 70.9% 12.8% 156
Figure 2 plots the cumulative distributions of actual and expected retirement ages. For
women, the ‘fit’ is surprisingly good; for men, however, it is apparent that the actual
cumulative retirement probability distribution is much smoother than the distribution
of expected probabilities and, in particular, that the ‘spike’ at age 65 is much smaller.
Also, in the case of men, the distribution of actual retirement ages is skewed around
the reported expectations. Unlike women, men are more likely to retire earlier than
they expected than later.
                                                
10   Just half of women who expect to retire at 60 actually retire at the date.  Less then 30% of men who
report 65 actually retire at 65, although 38% are still not retired by the second Wave.16
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of expected and actual retirement ages
As has already been argued above, differences between the overall distribution of
realisations and expectations may simply reflect the fact that individuals are being
asked to report a single point expectation. A more appropriate question is whether
reported expectations have predictive power as a measure of central tendency of
actual outcomes. Rather than looking at the overall distribution of expectations and
realisations, therefore, we focus on the distribution of actual retirement ages among
people with the same expected age of retirement and examine whether the expected
age corresponds to a measure of central tendency of this distribution.
Figure 3 plots the distributions of actual retirement ages for each expected age of
retirement between 60 and 65, for men and women aggregated together. It shows a
positive monotonic relationship between expected age of retirement and the bulk of
the distribution of actual ages of retirement with most people retiring when (or close
to when) they expected to retire at each given expected age of retirement.17
Figure 3: Distribution of actual retirement ages, by expected age
This preliminary evidence indicates that the expected age corresponds to a measure of
central tendency. To see which measure of central tendency corresponds most closely,
Table 4 considers the relationship between expected retirement age and the mean,
mode and median of actual retirement ages. Within the age range 56-65, reported
expectations appear reasonably consistent with all three measures, although none is a






, where  Ei is the
individual’s expected retirement age and  ! Ri  is the measure of central tendency, shows
that the median is associated with the lowest expectation error for both men and
women, and the mean with the greatest. This result is consistent with Bernheim’s
finding for the US that individuals’ reported expectations do not appear to correspond
to a mathematical ‘expectation’, but some other measure of central tendency.
 11
                                                
11 The truncation of the distribution of actual retirement ages imposed by the two waves of the UK
Retirement Survey makes a definitive test of the mean value hypotheses difficult. The closer the
expected retirement age to an individual’s age at the first wave, the more likely he or she is to retire
later than expected and the higher the mean actual retirement age relative to the expected.  Not
surprisingly, the highest proportions of individuals retiring after they expect at younger expected18
Table 4
What do people report: mean, median or mode?
Average of actual retirement ages
Expected Men Women
Age N Mean Mode Median Mean Mode Median
        56 3 58 58 58 56 55 55.5
        57 5 58 58 58 60 63 60
        58 6 57 57 57 59 58 58
        59 6 60 65 59 60 60 60
        60 106 60 60 60 60 60 60
        61 13 62 60 60.5 62 61 61
        62 17 62 62 62 62 62 62
        63 18 63 63 63 63 64 63
        64 10 64 64 64 65 65 64.5






1 191 27 7 52 33 15
No. obs 235 235 235 148 148 148
Explaining errors in expectations
The rational expectations hypothesis implies that in the absence of common shocks,
there should be no systematic errors between expectations and outcomes. With only
two waves of information we cannot test this explicitly since we cannot rule out the
possibility of common macro shocks, particularly since there was a recession in the
UK between the first and second waves. Instead we focus on whether differences
between expectations and realisations are related in a systematic way to individuals’
characteristics. This is motivated by a second implication of the rational expectations
hypothesis which is that expectation errors should be unpredictable. Hence deviations
between expectations and outcomes should not be correlated with an individual’s
observable characteristics at the time the expectations are formed since it would imply
that individuals have not used all available information to form their future retirement
                                                                                                                                           
retirement ages. The truncation of the distribution is also likely to present similar problems in testing19
expectations. However, this interpretation does have two important caveats.  One
possibility is that certain characteristics may be (post hoc) correlated with shocks that
occur between the two waves of the survey which cause expectations and realisations
to diverge. For example the recession that occurred between the two waves of the
Survey may have impacted differently across regions and employment sectors. A
second possibility is that the same variables that were associated with a greater
likelihood of a ‘don’t know’ response may also be correlated with individuals not
retiring when they said they expected to. Individuals with less compact probability
distributions over expected future retirement ages are more likely to give a don’t
know response or, if they do give a point expectation, not to retire at that age.
However, while such characteristics may be correlated with a higher probability of
not getting it right, they should equally be correlated with retiring earlier or later than
expected.
With this in mind we estimate an ordered probit regression on a dependent variable
that takes the value 1, 2 or 3 according to whether individuals retire before, when or
after they expected to. The estimates marginal effects are presented in Table 5 while a
full set of results is reported in the Appendix. As before, we include variables that
reflect household characteristics, including the respondent’s age, and education, and a
set of variables reflecting labour market status at the time of the first wave and
previous employment history. We include the number of years until expected age of
retirement as a conditioning variable since the sooner the expected age of retirement,
the less likely it is that individuals will retire before they expected to.
We also include possible shocks that may have occurred between the two waves,
namely the change in the individual’s severity score from Wave 1 to Wave 2 and a
dummy variable which takes the value one if the individual’s marital status has
changed (typically widowhood). We find that an increase in severity score between
the two waves of the survey is associated with individuals being more likely to retire
earlier than expected. Of course, in a full model of health and labour market
behaivour we would wish to instrument health status, but this is beyond the scope of
                                                                                                                                           
the modal value hypothesis, although less so if individuals have a compact probability distribution.20
the current analysis. We also find that change in marital status is significant for men,
who are more likely to retire earlier than expected as a result.
Table  5
Marginal effects on actual retirement age (relative to expected age)
Men Women
Before At After Before At After
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1    0.022  -0.017   -0.004 0.010 -0.006 -0.005
Ln(individual income) in W1   -0.072   0.058    0.015 0.178 -0.102 -0.077
No educational qualification *   -0.179   0.140    0.039 -0.056 0.011 0.045
Married in W1    0.116  -0.085   -0.030 ** -0.313 0.153 0.160
Divorced/ widowed in W1 **    0.283  -0.245   -0.038 -0.169 -0.061 0.231
W1 severity score 2-3    0.028  -0.022   -0.006 * 0.429 -0.277 -0.152
W1 severity score > 3    0.006  -0.005   -0.001 0.045 -0.013 -0.032
Occupational pension    0.000   0.000    0.000 -0.082 0.021 0.061
Saved for retirement    0.031  -0.025   -0.006 -0.031 0.006 0.024
Likes current job   -0.103   0.074    0.029 0.038 -0.007 -0.031
Employment status & history
Unemployed in W1 *    0.444  -0.400   -0.044 0.087 -0.030 -0.056
Part-time employed in W1   -0.267   0.170    0.097 0.024 -0.005 -0.018
Self-employed in W1    0.002  -0.001    0.000 * -0.235 -0.243 0.478
FT employed > 95% since 25   -0.090   0.069    0.020 0.014 -0.003 -0.011
% time not working since 25   -0.594   0.473    0.121 0.081 -0.046 -0.035
‘Shocks’
Change in severity score **    0.126  -0.100   -0.026 ** 0.223 -0.127 -0.096
Change in marital status **    0.320  -0.282   -0.038 -0.020 0.003 0.017
Number of years until
expected age of retirement
*    0.174  -0.139   -0.036 * 0.199 -0.113 -0.086
* Significant at 5%   **Significant at 10%
The results show that there are certain characteristics that are correlated with ‘getting
it wrong’ and, moreover, that these characteristics are associated with individuals
getting it systematically wrong. It is interesting that none of the employment history
variables, which affected whether or not individuals could form any point expectation,
affect whether they retire when they expected to. However, employment status in
Wave 1 does have a significant effect on ‘getting it right’ (or wrong). One possibility
is that this is correlated with shocks that occurred between the two waves of the
survey in a way that was not anticipated at the first wave. We find, for example, that
men who were unemployed at the first wave of the survey are significantly more21
likely to retire earlier than expected. It is plausible that this result reflects an impact of
the recession on the offer of wages which caused men to decide to exit the labour
market permanently at a younger age than than they had previously anticipated. We
would argue, therefore, that this result is not evidence against the rational expectations
hypothesis. It is, however, an interesting finding suggesting a genuine shock which
impacted on a particular group of people causing them to alter their retirement plans.
In the case of other wave 1 variables that are linked to systematic expectations error
such as marital status in Wave 1 (for men and women) and education (for men) such
an interpretation is harder to rationalise and these results are more likely to constitute
evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis.
5. Using expectations data to improve retirement modelling
Finally we examine the potential for using individuals’ retirement expectations to
improve modelling of retirement behaviour. At this stage we simply see whether there
is additional co-variation between actual and expected retirement age than is present
through common co-variation with the factors that would typically be included in a
model of retirement behaviour (gender, pension status etc). Because of the highly
selected nature of our sample, our retirement age regressions do not constitute a
proper reduced form model of retirement. We regress individuals’ actual age of
retirement on the full set of economic and demographic variables that we have been
using in our previous regressions and include individuals’ expected age of retirement
as an additional explanatory variable. Note that we include only variables that are
known at Wave 1. The aim is to see whether knowing individuals’ expected age of
retirement can improve predictions of actual retirement behaviour.
The coefficient on expected retirement age (summarised in Table 6) is positive and
significant for both men and women. This result suggests that expectations
information has a role to play in modelling actual retirement behaviour. Even if
individuals have an identical retirement model in respect of observables to the
researcher, one might imagine that modelling actual retirement behaviour can be
improved by inclusion of expectations insofar as the latter proxy unobservables such
as preferences, or tastes, for leisure.22
Table 6: Including expected retirement age – men and women
Dependent variable: Actual age of retirement
Men Women
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Expected retirement age .3421 .0467* .3015 .0629*
No. observations 245 150
Note to Table:
* Significant at 5%
A full set of variables reflecting individual’s age, income, employment etc is also included in the
regression.
6  Conclusions
This paper has considered the role of retirement expectations data, using the two
waves of the Retirement Survey in the UK. In this survey individuals are asked to
give point expectations of their expected retiremrent age, and interpreting the
responses requires considerable care. The distribution of expected retirement ages is
dominated by the state pension ages, while a high proportion of individuals say that
they don’t know when they expect to retire. On this basis it would be easy to dismiss
the expectations data as uninformative. However, our analysis shows that the
expectational data do contain information. First, expected ages of retirement vary
plausibly in line with covariates which implies that individuals do not simply report
random numbers. More importantly from the point of view of modelling actual
retirement behaviour, we find that reported expectations have additional predictive
power for actual retirement behaviour above their correlation with observable
characteristics.
Secondly, we argue that ‘don’t know’ responses do not simply reflect uninformed or
lazy responses. Our results show that the probability of giving ‘don’t know’ responses
is not random across the population, but is linked to factors which reflect the degree
of uncertainty about the timing of retirement, such as number of years until retirement
or membership of occupational pension schemes. A particularly important result in
this respect is that the majority of individuals who responded don’t know in the first
wave of the survey do give point expectations in the second wave at which point some
uncertainty may have been resolved.23
Finally, we address the issue of whether individuals’ retirement expectations are
rational, in the sense of being the best prediction of actual behaviour given all
available information. One implication of this is that, in the absence of shocks,
individuals’ expectations should correspond on average to their actual behaviour. We
argue that when individuals are asked to give point expectations, interpretation of
responses is not straightforward when transitions to retirement are probabilistic. Our
results are consistent with Bernheim’s finding that individuals appear to report their
most likely retirement age or the median of the underlying distribution, rather than the
mathematical expectation.
We find that just under half the sample retired when they said they expected to. We
argue that the probability of ‘getting it wrong’ is linked to similar factors that affect
whether or not individuals give a don’t know response, factors that affect the degree
of uncertainty around the time of retirement, although these factors should not be
associated with individuals making systematic expectations errors. In fact, we do find
evidence of systematic deviation between individuals’ reported expectations and their
actual retirement ages, with men retiring earlier than expected on average. With only
two waves of data, however, we cannot reject the possibility of a common shock,
particularly since a recession occurred between the two waves of the survey. We do
find that changes in reported health and changes in marital status between the two
waves of the survey are both linked to individuals retiring earlier than they expected.24
Appendix
Table A1:  Sample characteristics
Whole sample Sub-sample
used in analysis
Average age in Wave 1 61.7 58.6
Proportion who are female 54.4% 38.2%
Proportion with no educational qualifications 57.0% 52.0%
Proportion who are married in Wave 1 74.9% 79.4%
Proportion who are divorced/ widowed in Wave 1 18.3% 12.9%
Average severity score 0.86 0.41
Proportion who are working full-time in W1 24.2% 66.6%
Proportion who are working part-time in W1 13.1% 26.2%
Proportion who are self-employed in W1 9.4% 14.5%
Proportion with an occupational pension 47.0% 55.2%
No. of observations 2488 764
Severity scores
Severity scores are measures of self-assessed health status. They are based on the
international classification of impairments, disabilities and handicaps (ICDIH).
Separate scales are constructed for areas of locomotion, reaching and stretching,
dexterity, seeing, hearing, continence, communication, personal care, behaviour,
intellectual functioning, consciousness, digestion and disfigurement. The severity
score is constructed as a weighted average of the three highest severity scores from
the 13 areas: Highest + 0.4(second highest) + 0.3(third highest).2526
Table A1: Ordered Probit results
Dependent variable
1 = expects to retire before state pension age
2 = expects to retire at state pension age
3 = expects to retire after state pension age
Men Women
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 .1247 .0271* .3086 .0500 *
Ln(individual income) in W1 -.0681 .1053   .1800 .2194
No educational qualification -.0048 .1542   .3003 .2101
Married in W1 -.3293 .2775  -.5811 .4629
Divorced/ widowed in W1  -.2693 .3705  -.5741 .4847
W1 severity score 2-3  -.2701 .3124  -.1445 .5127
W1 severity score > 3  -.5803 .5289 -1.0652 .4762*
Occupational pension  -.5394 .1927*  -.2359 .2392
Saved for retirement  -.2502 .1556   .1811 .1954
Employment status and history
Unemployed in W1  -.3782 .3759  -.1412 .5880
Part-time employed in W1 1.0053 .4292*   .6207 .2646*
Self-employed in W1  -.0464 .2969  1.3922 .5727*
FT employed > 95% since age 25   -.3583 .2161**  -.5899 .4914
% time not working since age 25  -.1910 .9942   .1911 .5524
Cut1  4.9830 1.690* 16.599 3.161*
Cut2  7.9577 1.733* 18.720 3.202*
Number of observations 362 193




2(24), men; LR χ
2(14), women 84.96* 82.62*
* Significant at 5%   **Significant at 10%
Regression for men includes a set of 10 regional dummies which are jointly significant at 5% χ
2(10) =
20.99. Regional dummies are not significant in the case of women, and are excluded.27
Table A2: Ordered Probit results
Dependent variable
1 = retires before expected age
2 = retires at expected age
3 = retires after expected age
Men Women
Coeff SE Coeff SE
Individual characteristics
Age in Wave 1 -.0535 .0399 -.0192 .0515
Ln(individual income) in W1 .1763 .1256   -.3270 .2412
No educational qualification .4630 .1806    .1908 .2375
Married in W1 -.3071 .2981    .9196 .4789**
Divorced/ widowed in W1 -.7261 .4382    .7640 .5042
W1 severity score 2-3 -.0792 .3422  -1.176 .5610*
W1 severity score > 3 .2757 .5423   -.1450 .5559
Occupational pension -.0715 .2425    .2707 .2665
Saved for retirement -.0151 .1821    .1046 .2130
Likes current job -.0000 .1713   -.1300 .2031
Employment status & history
Unemployed in W1 -1.231 .4071   -.2726 .7224
Part-time employed in W1 .7614 .4726   -.0790 .2838
Self-employed in W1 -.0039 .3429   1.414 .6976*
FT employed > 95% since 25 .2320 .2386   -.0486 .5024
% time not working since 25 1.450 .9850   -.1478 .5782
‘Shocks’
Change in severity score -.3063 .1813   -.4080 .2413**
Change in marital status -.8305 .4790    .0712 .3322
Number of years until expected age of
retirement
-.4249 .0529
Cut1  -4.5316 2.6868  -3.687 3.311
Cut2  -2.5308 2.6778  -1.867 3.306
Number of observations 245 150





* Significant at 5%   **Significant at 10%28
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